This paper examines the impact that direct democracy (political participation) has on the location choice of citizens. Because location is defined in terms of private and public amenities, the citizen's decision involves a choice of a mixed bundle of goods. Since public amenities are the outcome of a collective rather than private action and is influenced by the political setting, this choice of location involves a consideration of private as well as fiscal variables. In a framework of a purely representative democracy a citizen whose preferences diverge from those voted on by a majority has but one option, the exit option. An alternative avenue for expressing discontent is exerting "voice" in the decision making process. This possibility however exists only in direct democracy through initiatives and referendums. The argument advanced is that in a direct democracy where the agenda setting power, especially in the case of initiatives, is vested in the hands of the voters, a citizen will exercise the exit option less frequently. Given that the instruments of direct democracy are issue based, the outcome of which will be known to the voter, the voter is able to make an informed decision on a fiscal issue(s) rather than voting for an uncertain fiscal "package" chosen by a legislator. I develop a choice model which incorporates political institutions into the framework within which the individual makes a decision to exit. The model includes the cost of voice relative to the cost of exit in the decision making process. The empirical analysis includes a sample of 24 direct democracy states in the US for the period 1985-1990 and 1995-2000. The empirical findings suggest that the voice option is negatively related to the citizens' decision to exit, i.e., migrate from these states. However this result is conditional upon the cost involved in exercising voice which is measured by the various requirements imposed by each state to qualify an issue to be placed on the ballot for acceptance or rejection by the voters as well as the power of the legislature to amend and/or repeal the ballot measure.
Introduction
The problem of getting consumers to reveal their preferences for collective public goods has been a vexing problem for a policy maker. Back in the 1950's Samuelson (1954) recognized that it would be difficult to induce the consumer-voter to accurately reveal his/her preferences for collective goods. This, assessment was refuted by Tiebout in his seminal paper of 1956 wherein he posits that the consumer-voter in effect reveals his/her preferences for collective goods by exercising the exit choice also known in the literature as "voting with one's feet". Thus, the consumer-voter in selecting a location to reside moves to that community that best satisfies his/her preference for the public goods under the assumption of perfect and free mobility. Tiebout's hypothesis is dependent on the ability of the individual to move freely across communities and that there exists at least one community or jurisdiction providing the individual's preferred fiscal package.
The choice of individuals in the public goods setting depends on the political institutions. Political systems differ in the manner in which economic agents interact and this influences the fiscal outcome. The two polar political regimes within which an individual makes his/her choices are autocracy and democracy. In an autocracy the decision making power lies in the hands of the dictator. In a democracy, the collective choice is determined by the median voter.
A democratic system can either be a representative democracy, a direct democracy or a combination of both. In a representative democracy, decisions over public sector choices are delegated to an elected body of representatives. In a direct democracy, the decision-making process is vested in the hands of the voters. Voters, in a direct democracy are the agenda-setters exercising their choice through referendums and initiatives.
The political institutions have an impact on the fiscal and other public sector outcomes. The expectation is that fiscal choices made under a representative democracy are likely to differ from those under a direct democracy.
In this chapter I examine the fiscal outcomes under the two alternative political regimes-a representative democracy and a direct democracy framework within a representative form of government where the voters have the option of voice, through initiatives and referenda, as well as exit. The question the empirical analysis seeks to answer is whether voters under direct democracy exercise the option of exit less frequently than in the case where voice is not allowed. The US states are used as the setting for the investigation. The process consists of initiatives and referenda.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section two provides a discussion of the fiscal process in a direct democracy. The theoretical framework, data and estimation results are presented in Section three. Section four concludes.
Direct Democracy: Initiatives and Referenda
In a direct democracy, for an issue to be placed on the ballot it has to go through a process of qualification for the ballot. This requires the formation of a group, whose members undertake the task of obtaining the necessary signatures and to inform voters on the issues to be placed on the ballot. Since voter participation through the exercise of voice is required to bring about a change in the status quo, the group will make all efforts to inform voters on the benefits of changing the status quo.
In theory, an initiative can be proposed by a single individual. However, the initiative becomes a viable option only when there are a sizeable number of individuals involved with the common objective of qualifying a measure for the ballot. Thus, the direct democracy process is similar to the formation of a club, where individuals come together to consume a set of common public goods, which in this case, qualifying the measure for the ballot and the fiscal package (outcome) if the ballot measure passes.
Initiatives are of two types, "direct" and "indirect". Direct Initiatives are those where constitutional amendments and statutes, proposed by the people are directly placed on the election ballot and subsequently submitted to the people for their approval or rejection. The state legislature has no role in this process. Indirect Initiatives on the other hand, involve statutes or amendments proposed by citizens although a petition must first be submitted to the state legislature in a regular legislative session. If the legislature fails to approve the statute or amendment or amends the proposal in a manner that is not acceptable to the proponents of the proposal, the proponents may proceed to collect the additional signatures, if required to have the original proposal submitted to the voters.
In addition to initiatives, voters participate in the political process through referenda. This is a process, by which the citizens have the power to reject laws or Amendments proposed by the legislature. Referenda are of two forms, popular and legislative. Popular Referendum refers to a process by which citizens have the power to refer, (through a petition) specific legislation that was enacted by their legislature to the voters to either accept or reject it. In contrast Legislative Referendum takes place when a state legislature, an elected official, state appointed constitutional revision commission or other governmental agency or department submits propositions to voters for their approval or rejection 1 .
The procedure whereby a citizen can exercise voice through initiatives or referenda varies across states. It suffices to mention here that once a measure is on the ballot the general requirement for passage of a ballot measure is a simple majority, except in a few states. The exceptions are Nebraska, Massachusetts and Mississippi. These states require a majority provided that the votes cast on the initiative equal a certain percent of total votes cast in the election 2 . Moreover, in no state does the Governor have the right to amend or repeal a ballot measure while California is the one state where the legislature has no power to repeal or amend an initiative. 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
The section begins with a brief review of exit and voice literature. Since the exit literature is well known as well as voluminous, the review presented below focuses on those studies that have dealt with both voice and exit options. Feld (1997) investigated the link between Tiebout's "voting with feet" and voice, "voting by participation" in a setting which allows voice as compared to one that does not.
The basic tenant of the exit-voice models is that a citizen of a jurisdiction, county or state when faced with actual public services (and tax price) which differs from his preferred or desired services, will express his discontent by either emigrating (exit) to another community offering another fiscal package, or staying and protest in the political The voice option, for it to be exercised depends on the political setting and the decision making process that the voters can use. This process varies from a pure direct democracy to representative democracy with referenda and initiatives. The effectiveness of voice is said to depend on a person's loyalty to the institution.
Building on the earlier works of Hirschman (1970), Orbell and Uno (1972) and Sharp (1984) among others, Feld develops a spatial model which "operationalizes the exit, voice and loyalty framework with respect to the horizontal organization of a federal state" (p459). Simply stated, the model contrasts the outcomes on fiscal matters (increasing taxes) where the elected government is not restricted by either fiscal competition or referendum, with those where one or the other restriction applies. In the first case, the political choice is that which serves the interests of the government or the political party. If on the other hand a referendum on tax policy were allowed then the government's proposal will only be implemented if it garnered majority votes. A referendum thus presents the implementation of governmental self-interested policy.
Contrast this outcome with a situation were the political setting does not allow a referendum to take place. If "exit" is possible (that is the conditions for exit are met), individuals who do not like the government proposal have the option to move to another jurisdiction where the tax-expenditure package meets with their preferences. Fiscal competition (jurisdictions compete to attract residents) may give rise to an outcome corresponding to the referendum outcome. Thus, the argument is made that exit and voice in a model of fiscal competition may be viewed as "perfect substitutes" (p 461) 3 .
Sharp uses a survey sample responses to test propositions advanced by Hirschman To investigate the use of voice in lieu of exit, Sharp calculated responses to two questions: "Have you ever personally gone to see, or spoken to or written to some local official about some need or problem?" and "Have you ever worked with others in the neighborhood to try to solve some local problems?" (p72).
In the HUD survey, thirty four percent of respondents reported having talked to others (second question) and 41 percent said that they had contacted their local officials to address their concerns (first question).
To empirically evaluate the link between exit and voice the author contrasted the behavior of two groups of the sample population-less educated and betted educated. For the less educated group, exit was "linked" with lower political participation (voice).
Among the better educated group, exit had less impact on the political participation of this group. In short, the evidence seems to suggest that exit diminishing voice is confined to the less educated group (p74).
Orbell and Uno (1972) applied the exit and voice framework to neighborhood problem solving. They reasoned that voice is a more effective method than exit in solving neighborhood problems, although the exercise of voice versus exit is conditional upon the socio-economic status of the individual.
Using survey data across 150 census tracts from Columbus, Ohio they find that higher status whites are likely to exercise both exit and voice in the face of neighborhood problems. On the other hand, lower-status whites in urban areas were more prone to exit than voice. For the higher status group both mechanisms were equally efficient. For the other group, the authors reasoned that the complexity of issues in urban areas makes the exit option a more viable cost strategy. In suburban areas voice seems to the dominant option among both high-status and low-status individuals though demographic characteristics did influence the outcome. Blacks were more likely, than whites, to use "voice" in response to neighborhood problems.
The Model
The theoretical model spelled out below is basically a two equations choice model consisting of a utility function and a budget constraint. Its basic structure follows that of Deacon and Shapiro (1975) . It differs from their model in that I incorporate the political framework within which the individual citizen-voter makes the decision to exit his/her original community.
The following assumptions are made:
• Exit is an option of last resort as the individual faces tangible and non-tangible costs of exiting a community in terms of costs of relocation, ability to obtain employment and alienation from a familiar neighborhood.
• Even though a Tiebout equilibrium may exist initially, there is the possibility of exit as people's preferences change over time and/or does the fiscal packages offered by the various jurisdictions. In any jurisdiction there will be a proportion of the population that will exercise exit Let the consumer-voter's utility function be given by
The subscript k refers to the kth jurisdiction and the superscript i refers to the ith The utility the voter derives from political participation (direct democracy) is assumed to depend on the costs incurred in getting an initiative to a vote. This cost, c k , is proxied by the legal requirements, signature requirements, circulation period, and legislative power over the direct democratic process and so on.
The demand for private goods by individual i (variable x i in equation 14.1) may be written as
where I k i is the consumer's income. The private good is chosen as the numeraire good whose price p k is equal to 1.
From equation (14.1) and (14.2), the indirect utility function for individual i is
where q k is now the level of public expenditure.
The individual's budget constraint is given by:
where, w k is the average wage, h i k is the number of hours worked t k is the tax rate and T k is the tax base. Assuming that the number of hours worked is fixed and that the tax base is the wage base i.e., w k = T k and substituting in equation (14.3) we get the following equation: Comparing fiscally induced migration from a location where voice is not an option, d k =0, (the case for exit) with a situation where voice is allowed, the expectation is that fiscally induced migration will be below (everything else the same) the level in locations where voters can only exercise the exit option.
From the theoretical construct, the empirical model to be estimated is given by equation (14.8) gives voters the most agenda control over the legislative process, I will be focusing on those states that allow for initiatives (direct and indirect). As there are significant variations between states in the process and usage of direct democracy, the estimation results are likely to be indicative of not only the impact of the availability of voice but also its viability as an alternative to exit, on voter choices.
The Mobility Sample: Descriptive Statistics
While the focus of the empirical analysis is on the political process as a determinant of voters' location choices, their behavior as "movers" or "non-movers" is clearly influenced by their socio-economic characteristics. 
Direct Democracy Sample
Data reported in Table 14 .4 convey information about the cost of the direct democratic process in states that permit initiatives, whereas the information given in Table 15 .5 provide data on some economic and political variables (such as median score of Democrat Legislature) that are likely to have significant impact on location choices. The outcome of the direct democracy process is measured by the passage rate. As shown in Table 14 .4 ballot measures that were successfully approved increased from 
State Specific Characteristics
State specific economic and political variables for 49 US states are given in Table 14 .5.
As discussed earlier, individual location choice is a function of the fiscal package and the political institutions.
In the choice model the citizen-voter exercises his/her exit decision by choosing the location that closely matches his/her preferences. But since not all fiscal decisions are made directly by the voter, the fiscal package available in a location will have an impact on the migration decision of the voter even in direct democracy states.
The fiscal package is defined by these two variables: the fiscal surplus and the tax burden. The tax burden is expected to be positively related to exit. is worth noting that the fiscal variables enter in the estimated equation in levels and not as differences although the theoretical models of both Tiebout and Buchanan and Goetz (1972) suggest that the differences and not levels influence the decision of exit. This was not pursued here as such formulation is associated with conditional logit method of estimation.
In addition to the fiscal variables, unemployment rate is included as indicative of the potential opportunities of relocation. Number of Observations 49 49 Note: Fiscal Surplus is positive. But in the Buchanan-Goetz terminology this is a negative surplus in the sense that the tax price paid by the individual exceeds the value of the service received.
Results
The two equations estimated are referred to as Model 1 and Model 2. Model 1 estimates the impact of direct democracy, as measured by the initiative dummy variable, on exit behavior. The dependent variable is EXIT which takes the value of 1 if a person had a different state of residence in 1990 (2000) from the home of residence in 1985 (1995) . Table 14 .6 we can see that the initiative dummy has a negative and significant impact on the exit decision. As hypothesized, voice does act as a substitute to exit up to the point where the cost of exercising voice becomes prohibitive, then the exit option is exercised. The log odds of exit decrease significantly when the possibility of exercising voice through the initiative becomes available or in other words when the initiative dummy is equal to 1.
Exit and voice being imperfect substitutes, the expectation is that an increase in the cost of one is equivalent to lowering the opportunity cost of the other. Cost of the initiative process is measured by the signature requirement variable (sign) and the publication of a voter information pamphlet (votinf) 6 . The possibility of legislative repeal of a qualified initiative is measured by the dummy variable LegRepeal.
As the percentage of signatures (sign) required in qualifying a measure to the ballot increases, the proponents of the initiative have to spend more on personnel and infrastructure to gather signatures which may increase the cost per capita of the initiative.
An increase in signature requirements would translate into fewer initiatives being proposed. Since the fiscal package cannot be altered without putting measures on the ballot the voter is more likely to resort to exit in the case of higher costs as the opportunity cost of exit is the equivalent cost of voice. This is confirmed from the results of the estimation of Model 1 (2000 sample) where an increase in the signature requirement had a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of exit. For the 1990 sample the coefficient is not significant. It is worthwhile to reiterate that the US direct democratic process is contained within representative democratic system and therefore the interaction between the legislature and the initiative process is a significant determinant of the substitutability of voice for exit. In some states the legislature is insulated from the direct democratic process. In other words, the state government can overturn or alter the intended legislative outcome of a successful initiative. In such a case, the voter does not perceive the voice process to be an effective one and therefore is more likely to choose the exit decision. This is evident from the coefficient on the variable legrepeal which is positive and significant for both samples.
Under the initiative process, the voter can vote only on one measure but the exit decision is made in response to a fiscal package. Thus, an issue has to be a significant element in the voter's fiscal package for voice to be an equal alternative to exit.
Therefore, we should find evidence that individuals exercise the exit option to obtain the preferred fiscal package even when voice is available. In the estimation, the fiscal package is measured by the average level of per capita fiscal surplus ( -192671.4 -196700 .09 *** refers to significant co-efficients at the 1% level of significance.** refers to significant coefficients at 5%level of significance. Figures in brackets refer to standard errors From the findings in Table 14 .7 it is evident that, exit was less likely in those states where the initiative process was used to legislate on fiscal issues. This is the case in both the 1990 sample and the 2000 sample. The greater the number of fiscal initiatives as a ratio of total initiatives proposed in the home state in 1985 (1995) , the less is the likelihood of an individual exiting that state as a consequence of the fiscal package.
Conclusion
Public choice theory has long focused on the influence of the political system as a determinant of voter choices. Different political systems impose different costs on the voters from exercising their choice and also provide different incentives. It is a proven fact that voters gain utility not only from the outcome of the political process but also from participating in the political process.
This chapter has examined the role played by direct democratic institutions in the US, with specific reference to the initiative process, in influencing voter choices.
Tiebout's hypothesis, which has been theoretically and empirically verified by a significant number of studies, posits that in representative democracies voters' preferences are expressed on the basis of exit from a community that did not match their preferences for the fiscal package.
A direct democratic system of initiatives and referenda provide alternatives to the voters to exercising Tiebout exit as a mechanism of preference revelation. Voice, or direct voting on issues by voters, is available to voters in 24 out of 50 states in the US.
These states provide another option to voters, aside from exit, to obtain their preferred fiscal package. It is a collective process, unlike exit, and therefore it is not a perfect substitute to exit. Findings reported in the chapter suggest that in states where voters can express their preferences through voice (initiatives), they are likely to utilize the exit option less as a means of obtaining their preferred fiscal package. But for voice to be a viable option, certain conditions have to be met
• The voter is able to make informed decisions in that the direct democratic process is information-intensive. This is not always the case under a purely representative democracy where the voter elects a candidate who belongs to a political party whose agenda includes a whole spectrum of issues and not just fiscal issues.
• The voter obtains utility by participating in the decision-making process and is therefore less likely to be dissatisfied with the fiscal outcome that is chosen.
As neither exit nor voice is costless and since the costs involved in the exercise of exit, is borne by the individual whereas the cost of voice is shared by the community, the exit-voice trade-off is not time-invariant. Lowering the political participation costs would make the voice option more attractive to the voter and lessen the need to resort to exit.
Notes
1. This type of constitutional referendum maybe either constitutionally required (in the case of constitutional amendments) or because the legislature, government official or agency chooses to submit the proposal directly to the people. Every state except Delaware requires state constitutional amendments to be placed on the ballot for voter approval or rejection.
2. 35% Nebraska, 30% Massachusetts and 40% in Mississippi. Wyoming requires an amount in excess of 50% if those voting in the preceding general election. In Nevada an initiated constitutional amendment has to receive a majority vote in two successive general elections.
3. Feld qualifies this argument by pointing out the requirements for it to hold. 4. Households living in Hawaii, and District of Columbia were dropped from the sample.
5. California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan and Mississippi 6. The length of the circulation period was excluded on the basis of an analysis of the features of the initiative process. Additionally the ballot circulation process subjectively differs across the initiative states and these differences cannot be captured in a single measure.
7. Gerber (1999) showed that like business groups which have access to financial resources, citizen groups have access to personnel to influence legislation. She bases her findings on extensive surveys of activities of interest groups and campaign finance records from 168 direct legislation campaigns. Her study suggests that citizen groups are more effective in using direct legislation to pass new laws than economic interest groups and cautions that money is not equivalent to influence. Nonetheless the cost of the initiative is of significant interest to the voter. Table 14 .6 coefficients in the exit model both for the 1990 and the 2000 sample indicate that on average voters are likely to exit from locations that provide a larger negative surplus.
As shown in
9. The reason for using a dummy variable is because the data is on fiscal initiatives proposed and not fiscal initiatives passed and therefore such a measure would help determine the effectiveness of fiscal initiatives as a whole though a more ideal measure would be the number of fiscal initiatives that were actually passed.
